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The present study investigates the role that shape and color play in the representation
of animate (i.e., animals) and inanimate manipulable entities (i.e., fruits), and how the
importance of these features is modulated by different tasks. Across three experiments
participants were shown either images of entities (e.g., a sheep or a pineapple) or
images of the same entities modified in color (e.g., a blue pineapple) or in shape (e.g., an
elongated pineapple). In Experiment 1 we asked participants to categorize the entities
as fruit or animal. Results showed that with animals color does not matter, while shape
modifications determined a deterioration of the performance – stronger for fruit than for
animals. To better understand our findings, in Experiments 2 we asked participants to
judge if entities were graspable (manipulation evaluation task). Participants were faster
with manipulable entities (fruit) than with animals; moreover alterations in shape affected
the response latencies more for animals than for fruit. In Experiment 3 (motion evaluation
task), we replicated the disadvantage for shape-altered animals, while with fruits shape
and color modifications produced no effect. By contrasting shape- and color- alterations
the present findings provide information on shape/color relative weight, suggesting that
the action based property of shape is more crucial than color for fruit categorization,
while with animals it is critical for both manipulation and motion tasks. This contextual
dependency is further revealed by explicit judgments on similarity – between the altered
entities and the prototypical ones – provided after the different tasks. These results
extend current literature on affordances and biofunctionally embodied understanding,
revealing the relative robustness of biofunctional activity compared to intellectual one.
Keywords: shape, color, animate self-moving entities, inanimate manipulable entities, categorization,
manipulation judgments, motion judgments, biofunctional understanding
INTRODUCTION
The ability to recognize and to categorize objects and entities is crucial for our species. In order
to survive, we need to recognize objects and entities and to decide whether to assign them to
a given category or not. In the present work we will investigate with diﬀerent tasks the role
that shape and color play in the representation of animals and fruit. Speciﬁcally, we will deal
with cases in which the exemplars that we see are quite diﬀerent in shape and color from the
typical members of the categories of animals and fruits. For example, we typically think of yellow
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bananas, and brown gorillas, so what if we see a blue, or a
square banana? “Blue bananas, green gorillas,” quotes a song
for children (youtube.com/watch?v=kxSWGIm2XtI). If objects
appear in a deformed color or shape, would we still recognize
them? And, even if we recognize them, would we interact with
them in an appropriate way? Finally, when directly contrasting
color and shape, which one turns out to be more crucial for object
recognition, categorization, and for interaction with objects?
The role of shape for object recognition has been underlined
in a variety of theories. According to one of the most inﬂuential
and sophisticated theories (Biederman, 1987; Biederman and Bar,
1999) objects are represented in terms of structural descriptions –
specifying object parts and their relationships. In this theory,
object recognition involves recognizing geometrical ions, geons,
corresponding to object parts. The higher the number of parts,
the more diﬃcult recognition is. Disrupting these parts and their
relations signiﬁcantly impairs object recognition.
At a theoretical level, the strict interrelation between shape
and action is particularly relevant for embodied and grounded
(EG) theories of cognition (Barsalou, 2008; Borghi and Pecher,
2012; Borghi and Caruana, 2015). These views suggest that our
understanding of the world is grounded in action, and that our
body shapes the way we interact with objects and entities around
us and the way we represent them.
Shape and Action
Evidence from EG view have recently underlined the role of shape
on object categorization, basically due to the relationship of shape
with action (see Morlino et al., 2015). Well-known evidence on
the so-called “shape bias” (e.g., Landau et al., 1988, 1992) has
shown that, at least inWestern societies, novel nouns are typically
extended on the basis of shape similarity, rather than on the basis
of similarity of color or texture. This bias is present in 2-year-
olds and becomes rather stable from 3 years on. Smith (2005)
has demonstrated that shape categories are not static and pre-
deﬁned, but that their formation is inﬂuenced by action: moving
an object horizontally (or vertically) and moving it symmetrically
(or asymmetrically) changes the range of shapes seen as similar.
Using both a similarity evaluation task and an action-based
sorting task, Iachini et al. (2008) compared novel objects varying
in properties with a diﬀerent degree of interactivity: grip (handle,
broken handle), shape (triangle, square), size (large, small)
and color (red, blue). The role of shape was clearly linked to
action: shape played a role in the sorting task when participants
were required either to observe and interact with the objects
(Vision + Action) or to interact with them when blindfolded
(Action). Color, instead, was not relevant across the two tasks.
Actually the importance of shape – due to structural reasons –
is compatible with both EG and non-embodied views of
cognition. The relationship between shape and action argues
instead in favor of EG theories.
Shape and Flexibility
Embodied and grounded theories have emphasized that
aﬀordances of objects are strictly related to objects’ shape. For
some years studies on aﬀordances – intended as opportunities to
act that the environment oﬀers to organisms (Gibson, 1979) –
were mainly aimed at showing that aﬀordances are activated in
an automatic way, i.e., independently from the task at hand (e.g.,
shape, Tucker and Ellis, 1998). Nevertheless recent research has
started to emphasize the ﬂexibility rather than the automaticity
in aﬀordance activation. Evidence has shown that the activation
of object aﬀordances is modulated by the physical context (e.g.,
Yoon et al., 2010; Borghi et al., 2012; Kalenine et al., 2014), by the
social context (e.g., Ellis et al., 2013; Gianelli et al., 2013; Scorolli
et al., 2012, 2014), and by the task (Tipper et al., 2006; Pellicano
et al., 2010; Cho and Proctor, 2011, 2013; Hsu et al., 2011).
Overall this evidence suggests that the role of shape in object
recognition is aﬀected by both the stimulus and the task at hand.
This ﬂexibility is compatible with EG views of cognition.
Color and Object Recognition
While shape is typically included in all models of object
recognition, the role of color is more disputed: it is deﬁnitely our
aim to add a piece to this puzzle. Recent behavioral and brain
imaging evidence has highlighted the importance of color for
object recognition and conceptual representation (e.g., Martin
et al., 1995; Chao and Martin, 1999; Kellenbach et al., 2001;
Thompson-Schill, 2003; Connell and Lynnot, 2009; van Dam
et al., 2012; Yee et al., 2012). A recent meta-analysis on 35
experiments (Bramão et al., 2011) conﬁrmed that color improves
object recognition, mostly for color diagnostic objects but also for
non- color diagnostic ones. Color facilitated object recognition
mainly in naming tasks, while it had only a marginally signiﬁcant
eﬀect in semantic categorization tasks and it didn’t play a
signiﬁcant role in property veriﬁcation task. As to property
veriﬁcation task, ﬁndings are not straightforward: using a naming
and a property veriﬁcation task, Therriault et al. (2009) found that
color information is regularly used in recognition, at least when
diagnostic colors are concerned. In a similar vein, Simmons et al.
(2007) required participants to perform a property veriﬁcation
task indicating whether a color or a motor property was typically
true of a given object (e.g., TAXI-yellow, HAIR-combed); then
they asked participants to perform a color perception task.
Through fMRI they found that a region of the left fusiform gyrus
was active both during color perception and during access to
conceptual knowledge on color.
Further studies have investigated the role of color with
diﬀerent kinds of entities showing that color is more relevant
for categorization of natural objects compared to artifacts. For
example, Price and Humphreys (1989) found that naming of
natural objects was facilitated by color. This can be due to the
fact that their members are more similar, and color information
serves to solve the competition between diﬀerent members; an
alternative explanation ascribes this diﬀerence to the fact that
color is typically more diagnostic for natural objects.
Overall the above reviewed literature provides evidence of
a strong impact of shape on object recognition; this impact
is strongly modulated by the stimulus and the task at hand.
However, also color information seems to play an important
role: it should deﬁnitively be included in models of object
recognition, particularly for color-diagnostic objects as natural
objects. Nevertheless the small amount of empirical studies
does not allow to build a model addressing also the issue of
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color-information ﬂexibility. As to relevance for EG views, it
is evident that color is not structurally linked to action: its
importance can be still compatible with both EG and non-
embodied views of cognition. Nevertheless its eventual ﬂexibility
would argue in favor of EG theories, according to which the way
objects aﬀord actions and the way knowledge on object categories
is accessed is contextually modulated and ﬂexible.
Open Issues
With the present study we intend to address the open issues left
from the overviewed literature:
(a) Non-embodied research on object recognition has typically
considered shape as a static object property. This literature
has neglected the relationship between objects and dynamic
bodily actions. In the vein of EG perspectives, we intend to
further address the idea that the relevance of shape for object
recognition is not just due to structural reasons but to its
importance for action.
(b) In the majority of the studies – from both embodied and
non-embodied literature – color was considered per se or
compared with other surface properties, such as texture, and
only rarely with shape. Furthermore, even if diﬀerences in
the role played by color with natural objects and artifacts
have been investigated, more ﬁne-grained diﬀerences within
natural objects – and the possible modulation determined by
the task at hand – have not been fully explored.
To address these issues we decided to directly contrast shape
and color, in order to disambiguate for which tasks shape is
more/less relevant than color, as well as why they can play
diﬀerent roles.
To this aim in the present work we adopted the method
suggested by the song: participants were presented with ﬁgures
of common animals and fruits, with standard or deformed color
and shape (e.g., yellow oblong bananas – baseline – vs. yellow
square bananas vs. blue oblong bananas) and were asked to
respond by pressing two diﬀerent keys on the keyboard (see
Bazzarin et al., 2007, for a similar method used to investigate
the eﬀects of variations in object size). We tested how and to
what extent deformations in color and shape diﬀerently inﬂuence
the category assigned to the items (Experiment 1) as well as
judgments on manipulability or on motion (Experiments 2
and 3).
From a theoretical point of view our decision was to select
entities with which we typically act or not (manipulable vs.
non manipulable objects) and to use tasks that put a diﬀerent
emphasis on categorization (animals vs. fruits: Experiment 1),
on action (manipulable vs. non-manipulable objects/entities:
Experiment 2) or on motion (animate and self-moving vs. non-
animate objects/entities: Experiment 3). We decided to focus on
natural objects as they are more color-diagnostic than artifacts.
Within natural objects we selected manipulable inanimate objects
which are typically acted upon (i.e., fruits and vegetables)
and non-manipulable and animate entities endowed with self-
propelled motion (i.e., animals). We altered in turn their color
or their shape (for studies on manipulable objects, see Gerlach
et al., 2002; Boronat et al., 2005; Borghi et al., 2007; Marino et al.,
2011a,b; Rueschemeyer et al., 2011).
The overall work is structured in the following way:
after Experiment 1, in which a standard categorization task
was employed, Experiment 2 was designed to investigate if
participants would perform similarly to the categorization task
also in a diﬀerent task, that directly triggers information on
manipulation. Then a motion judgment task (Experiment 3) was
employed to test the eﬀects of color and shape in a task that does
not refer at all to potential interactions. Through independent
ratings we also investigated if the previous performed task (i.e.,
categorization vs. manipulation vs. motion tasks) modulates
explicit judgments on the same entities.
In line with both the literature and the research directions
suggested by the EG theories of cognition we advance the general
prediction that shape will have a prominent role across the tasks
and the entities. The ﬁrst reason underlying the importance of
shape is that altering the shape of an object/entity provokes a
modiﬁcation of its structure. More crucially to us, another reason
might underlie the relative importance of shape: while color is
only a visual property, shape processing involves both the visual
and the tactile/motor system, and it is directly related to action
(Smith, 2005). However, we predict that also color does have a
weight, speciﬁcally that the relative weight of shape and color
strongly depends on both the speciﬁc entity and the task at hand.
Resting on EG views, and speciﬁcally on a view where
biofunctional understanding underlies psychological
comprehension (Iran-Nejad, 2011), we formulate the following
predictions:
(1) The three kinds of tasks should have diﬀerent eﬀects on
stimuli processing – not explained by explicit judgments –
since objects are conceived in terms of the possible actions
we can perform on them (categorization task), but the
speciﬁc task at hand could trigger a more ﬁne-grained action
(manipulation evaluation task) and/or force to focus on the
entity self-propelled movement, that is rather independent
from the observer (motion evaluation task).
In particular:
(2) Fruits: if objects are represented as patterns of potential
action, rather than simply in terms of their perceptual
characteristics (e.g., Wilson, 2002; Borghi and Pecher, 2012;
Borghi and Caruana, 2015), with both a categorization and
a manipulative task the property of shape should be crucial.
This prediction is derived from the EG cognition views,
according to which entities are conceived in terms of the
possible actions we can perform with them. Nevertheless –
if cognition is not only ‘based on’ but also ‘oriented to’
action – with a task directly triggering manipulation, color
should aﬀect performance similarly to shape, as this task does
activate a precise simulation of the agent-object interaction.
In this case, the color of a fruit could be diagnostic of
its eventual toxicity, or of its degree of ripening (e.g., a
rotten apple). On the contrary, for a motion evaluation task
neither the alterations of shape nor of color should aﬀect the
performance with inanimate – non-self-moving entities.
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(3) Animals: shape should bemore important for amanipulation
evaluation task than for a categorization task, as the ﬁrst
forces us to focus on a possible manipulation of the entity,
that we are less used to directly handle compared to
fruits. Shape should have also a stronger weight than color
with a motion evaluation task: altered shape, as well as
missing parts, would severely modify self-moving entities’
movement, and/or inﬂuence their status of living beings.
The prediction that structural shape modiﬁcations would be
particularly eﬀective for animals in the motion evaluation
task is derived from an embodied cognition view, since
structural changes would drastically modify their capability
to move. Actually a structural role of shape could be
predicted also by disembodied theories of cognition, but
these theories would predict a strong decay of participants’
performance for shape alterations regardless of the kind of
task (that is, also for the categorization task).
(4) Finally, if cognition is based on our previous sensory-motor
experience with the external world, the previously executed
task should determine also a long lasting eﬀect on the
perceived similarity between the manipulated entities and
the prototypical ones. We still expect a powerful eﬀect of
shape alterations, but – more relevant to our hypotheses –
we predict that participants who have previously performed
a manipulation task will judge the shown entities as more
similar to the imagined-prototypical ones compared to both
participants who hadn’t previously performed any task
and participants who had previously performed a motion
evaluation task.
SEMANTIC CATEGORIZATION TASK
Experiment 1 was designed to test the role played by color and
shape in a standard categorization task. We focused on natural
objects – since they are typically considered as color-diagnostic
entities – and contrasted manipulable and non-manipulable
entities.
Participants
Twenty students from the University of Bologna took part in
the experiment (10/20 were females). All were native Italian
speakers, right-handed, and had normal or corrected-to- normal
vision; they gave their informed consent to the experimental
procedure. Their ages ranged from 19 to 30 years old (M = 23.40;
SD= 3.19). The study was approved by the local ethic committees
(Department of Psychology, University of Bologna).
Materials
We selected 16 pictures of fruits and vegetables (pineapple,
orange, apricot, avocado, banana, carrot, cherry, strawberry,
kiwi, almond, apple, blackberry, walnut, hot pepper, peach,
grapes) and 16 of animals (dog, rabbit, cat, red snapper, shark,
turtle, parrot, mouse, rooster, pig, horse, lion, giraﬀe, elephant,
crocodile, sheep), having a typical color and shape (baseline).
Then we modiﬁed these pictures, to obtain 64 further pictures
of fruits and animals, altered in turn in shape or color (see
FIGURE 1 | (Above) Pictures of a pineapple (manipulable, not self-moving
entity) and a sheep (non-manipulable, self-moving entity); (below) the pictures
of both the fruit and the animal were altered in color (_C) or in shape (_S).
two examples in Figure 1). Overall the stimuli consisted of 96
images.
As far as materials assessment is concerned, ﬁrst of all it is
worth noting that image manipulation software products (e.g.,
GIMP 2, the open-source raster graphics editor we used) do not
allow ﬁxing shape and color modiﬁcations to the same degree of
distortions for both the properties. Secondly, even if in literature
we did not ﬁnd paradigms similar to ours, for sure volumetric
properties typically aﬀect objects recognition more than surface
properties (Banno and Saiki, 2015; Reppa et al., 2015; Rosselli
et al., 2015; Saarela and Landy, 2015; Schlangen and Barenholtz,
2015). However, as far as our speciﬁc hypotheses were concerned,
it was crucial to ascertain that the perceptual complexity of
both the color- and the shape-modiﬁed stimuli was comparable
across stimuli (fruits-vegetables and animals). In order to check if
‘our’ color and shape distortions could be comparable across the
diﬀerent domains (fruits-vegetables vs. animals) an independent
group of twelve participants (seven females, ages ranging from
26 to 32 years old, M = 28.08, SD = 2.23) was presented with
each entity in its original shape and color and – immediately
below – with the same entity altered for shape or color (both
the stimuli were simultaneously visible in the computer screen).
Each participant was asked to rate the degree of similarity
between the two entities (“identical” – “completely diﬀerent”)
on a graduated 100-point scale. The collected scores underwent
a 2 (Stimulus: Animal vs. Fruit) × 3 (Alteration: Color vs.
Shape vs. Absent) mixed factor ANOVA, with both variables
manipulated within participants. The ANOVA showed a main
eﬀect of alteration, F(2,90) = 456.44, MSE = 49.21, p < 0.01: as
expected, shapemodiﬁcations altered the entitiesmore than color
modiﬁcations (M = 65.40, SD = 7.56; M = 42.16, SD = 7.94),
post hoc Tukey’s Honestly Signiﬁcant Diﬀerence (HSD): p< 0.01.
Nevertheless we did not found diﬀerences between fruits and
animals, nor an interaction between the kind of entity and the
kind of alteration. Finally we performed separate analyses for
animals and fruits: we found basically the same pattern for both
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entities, that is a signiﬁcant eﬀect of the kind of alteration due to
stronger dissimilarities judgments provided for shape-alterations
than for color-alterations (post hoc Tukey’s HSD: ps < 0.01:
Animals: shape-alterations = 68.89; color-alterations = 42.04;
baseline = 12.64; Fruits: shape-alterations = 62.92; color-
alterations = 42.27; baseline = 12.45). Therefore, even if
explicit judgments provided by the independent group of
participants showed greater perceptual complexity of shape-
modiﬁed stimuli compared to color-modiﬁed ones, crucially
color and shape alterations aﬀected fruits and animals in a similar
way. As we found no diﬀerences in similarity judgments across
diﬀerent stimuli, reasonably altered fruits and animals should be
comparable in the experimental tasks.
To further check if the chosen distortions allow observers
to categorize the entities as fruits-vegetables or animals, an
independent group of ten participants (eight females, ages
ranging from 28 to 42 years old,M = 32.00, SD= 5.76) was asked
(1) to decide whether each depicted entity – natural entity, color-
modiﬁed entity, shape-modiﬁed entity – was an animal or a fruit-
vegetable; (2) to specify its name (as to context eﬀects in naming
seeMalt, 2013). The stimuli were presented on a computer screen;
the answers were collected by the experimenter. Two random
orders of the stimuli were used; the original version of the
entities (i.e., not modiﬁed either in color and shape) followed the
altered versions. Crucially, all participants correctly distinguished
animals from fruits-vegetables; moreover they rightly named
all the entities except the shape-modiﬁed turtle and the shape-
modiﬁed crocodile (7/10 and 6/10 participants, respectively,
were not able to correctly name the entities, nevertheless they
identiﬁed them as animals), the shape-modiﬁed cherry (2/10
participants produced the name ‘red pepper,’ i.e., still a vegetable)
and the orange (it was categorized as ‘lemon’ by two persons, i.e.,
still a fruit).
As none of our tasks required to correctly identify the
individual entity, but only to categorize them as fruits-vegetables
vs. animals, or as manipulable non-self-moving entities vs. non-
manipulable/self moving entities, we used the selected entities
across all the three experiments.
Procedure
Participants were tested individually in a quiet laboratory room.
They sat on a comfortable chair in front of a computer screen
and were instructed to look at a ﬁxation cross (+) that remained
on the screen for 500 ms. When the ﬁxation cross disappeared, a
photograph of one object (6◦ × 6◦visual angle degree) appeared
on the screen for 1000 ms. The timer started operating when
the image appeared on the screen. All stimuli were displayed
centrally on the monitor and randomized. The experiment
was programmed using E-prime2 software (Psychology Software
Tools). Each object was seen once by each participant.
For each image, half of the participants were instructed to
press one key (‘M,’ on the right) with the right hand if the shown
object was an animal; they had to press a diﬀerent key (‘X,’ on
the left) with the left hand if the object was a fruit-vegetable. The
other half of the participants performed the same task with the
opposite hand mapping. Participants received feedback for both
correct and incorrect responses. All participants were informed
that their response times would be recorded and were asked to
respond as quickly as possible while still maintaining accuracy.
The 96 experimental trials were preceded by six practice trials (a
lemon and a hedgehog: natural colored and shaped/altered for
color and shape), in order to allow participants to familiarize
themselves with the procedure.
Statistical Analysis
The percentage of errors underwent a 2 (Mapping: Right hand–
Fruit and Left hand– Animals vs. Left hand–Fruit and Right
hand–Animals) × 2 (Stimulus: Animal vs. Fruit) × 3 (Alteration:
Color vs. Shape vs. Baseline) mixed factor ANOVA, with
Mapping as between- participants variables. We conducted the
analyses with participants as a random factor. After eliminating
all incorrect responses, RTs were submitted to an ANOVA with
the same factors. Finally we performed two separate analyses for
animals and fruit: RTs were submitted to a 2 (Mapping) × 2
(Alteration) mixed factor ANOVA, with Mapping as between-
participants variable. We used the Tukey’s HSD procedure to
correct for multiple means comparisons as it aﬀords the same
protection as the Bonferroni adjustment when comparing many
treatment groups, but it also makes easier to reject the hypothesis
of no diﬀerence when there are real diﬀerences between the
groups. We did not perform a prospective power analysis, but
only a retrospective one (Hoenig and Heisey, 2001).
Results
Overall
As to percentage of errors, we found no signiﬁcant eﬀects.
Analyses on RTs showed a main eﬀect of the kind of alteration,
F(2,36) = 7.23,MSE = 12684, η2p = 0.29, observed power = 0.91,
p < 0.002, as participants responded signiﬁcantly slower to odd
shaped stimuli (M = 558 ms) than to baseline (M = 523 ms, post
hoc Tukey’s HSD: p< 0.002). Odd shaped stimuli slightly diﬀered
from odd colored stimuli (M = 537 ms, post hoc Tukey’s HSD:
p = 0.07). The baseline did not diﬀer from the color-modiﬁed
condition.
Animals
Percentage of errors. M = 1.06%; SD = 1.87. We found no
signiﬁcant eﬀects.
TABLE 1 | The table summarizes the Response Latencies from the three
Experiments (i.e. categorization; manipulation; agency).
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3
Categorization Manipulation Motion
Alteration A F A F A F
Color 544 ms 530 ms 479 ms 471 ms 557 ms 558 ms
(87) (72) (70) (83) (131) (127)
Shape 554 ms 562 ms 517 ms 493 ms 589 ms 573 ms
(110) (102) (90) (83) (158) (113)
Absent
(baseline)
519 ms 526 ms 465 ms 458 ms 557 ms 551 ms
(79) (74) (67) (69) (139) (133)
Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.
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RTs. The ANOVA showed a main eﬀect of alteration,
F(2,36) = 4.68, MSE = 6520, p < 0.02: participants responded
slower to odd shaped stimuli (M = 554 ms) than to baseline
(M = 519 ms), post hoc Tukey’s HSD: p < 0.01 (see Table 1).
There was no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the color- and the
shape-alterations conditions (p = 0.63).
Fruit
Percentage of errors. M = 1.18%; SD = 1.43. We found no
signiﬁcant eﬀects.
RTs. Analyses with fruit produced a main eﬀect of alteration,
F(2,36) = 5.01, MSE = 7562, p < 0.02: participants responded
slower to odd shaped stimuli (M = 562 ms) than to baseline
(M = 526 ms) and to odd colored stimuli (M = 530 ms), post
hoc Tukey’s HSD: ps < 0.04 (see Table 1). The color modiﬁed
condition did not diﬀer from the baseline one (p = 0.93).
Discussion
The results show that with a task directly activating categorical
knowledge, with both manipulable (i.e., fruit) and non-
manipulable entities (i.e., animals) color does not matter,
while shape modiﬁcations determine a deterioration of the
performance. Interestingly this deterioration was stronger
for fruit (odd-shaped stimuli diﬀered from both the
baseline and the odd-colored condition) than for animals
(odd-shaped stimuli did not diﬀer from the odd-colored
condition).
Crucially these ﬁndings cannot be explained resting on the
selected stimuli, as in the materials assessment (see above) we
found that shape-alterations aﬀected explicit judgments on the
two kinds of entities (fruits and animals) in a similar way; the
same was true for color- alterations.
TASK DEPENDENCY: MANIPULATION
AND MOTION EVALUATION TASKS
Manipulation
Experiment 2 was designed to investigate if participants would
perform similarly to the categorization task in a task that directly
involves access to object manipulability. Participants were asked
to judge if they could grasp and lift with their right-hand the
displayed entities to put them inside a black backpack located in
front of the them (for a similar task see Borghi et al., 2007; Hirose
et al., 2010).
Method
Nineteen students from the University of Bologna took part in the
experiment (10/19 were females). All were native Italian speakers
and right-handed by self-report; all had normal or corrected-
to-normal vision. They all gave their informed consent to the
experimental procedure. Their ages ranged from 20 to 30 years
old (M = 23.50; SD = 2.96). The study was approved by the
local ethic committees (Department of Psychology, University of
Bologna).
We used the samematerials and procedure as in Experiment 1,
except for the task: for each image, 10 participants were instructed
to press one key with the right hand if the shown object could
be lifted with a hand and put inside a backpack. The backpack
was located in front of them, on the right side of the computer
display. If the object could not be lifted and put inside the
backpack they had to press a diﬀerent key with the left hand.
Nine participants performed the same task with the opposite
handmapping. After the experiment, participants rated how each
depicted object diﬀered from how they would imagine it (see
Long Term Eﬀect of Task: Explicit Judgments).
The percentage of errors underwent a 2 (Mapping: Right
hand–yes and Left hand–no vs. Right hand–no Left hand–
yes) × 2 (Stimulus: Animal vs. Fruit) × 3 (Alteration: Color
vs. Shape vs. Baseline) mixed factor ANOVA, with Mapping as
between-participants variables. We conducted the analyses with
participants as a random factor. After eliminating all incorrect
responses, RTs were submitted to an ANOVA with the same
factors. Finally we performed two separate analyses for animals
and fruit: RTs were submitted to a 2 (Mapping) × 2 (Alteration)
mixed factor ANOVA, with Mapping as between-participants
variable.
Results
Overall
As to percentage of errors, we found a main eﬀect of the kind
of mapping: with mapping “Right hand–yes, the entity can
be put inside the backpack” participants produced signiﬁcantly
more errors (M = 2.80%) than with the opposite mapping
(M = 0.77%): F(1,17) = 7.73, MSE = 116.37, p < 0.02. We
found also an interaction between the kind of mapping and
the kind of stimulus: F(1,17) = 5.56, MSE = 9.71, p < 0.04,
basically due to the fact that both with animals and fruits
participants produced more errors with the mapping “Right-
hand yes” (A:M = 3.26%; F: M = 2.33%) than with the opposite
mapping (A: M = 0.66%; F: M = 0.88%), post hoc Tukey’s HSD:
ps < 0.01.
Analyzing RTs we found a main eﬀect of the kind of stimulus
F(1,17)= 5.06,MSE= 4310.21, η2p = 0.23, observed power= 0.56,
p< 0.04 as participants were faster with fruits (M = 474 ms) than
with animals (M = 486 ms). Analyses showed also a main eﬀect
of the kind of alteration: F(2,34) = 8.51,MSE = 18564, η2p = 0.33,
observed power = 0.95, p < 0.001: post hoc Tukey’s HSD showed
that shape- alterations (M = 504 ms) diﬀered from the baseline
condition (M = 461 ms) and deteriorated the performance more
than color-alterations (M = 475 ms, ps < 0.03).
Animals
Percentage of errors. M = 2.03%; SD = 2.41. We found a main
eﬀect of Mapping, as participants performed better when they
had to respond to non-manipulable objects (animals) with the
right hand (M = 0.66%) than with the left one (M = 3.26%),
F(1,17) = 9.64,MSE = 9.24, p< 0.01.
RTs. The ANOVA on RTs showed a main eﬀect of alteration,
F(2,34) = 9.41, MSE = 13244, p< 0.001: participants responded
slower to odd shaped stimuli (M = 517 ms) than to baseline
(M = 465 ms) and to odd colored stimuli (M = 479 ms), post
hoc Tukey’s HSD: ps< 0.01. The baseline condition did not diﬀer
from the color alteration condition (p = 0.22; see Table 1).
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Fruits
Percentage of errors. M = 1.64%; SD = 1.83. With fruits we
found a trend eﬀect of Mapping, as participants performed
slightly better when they had to respond to fruits with the
left hand (M = 0.89%) than with the right one (M = 2.33%),
p = 0.053.
RTs. As with animals, analyses on fruits showed a main eﬀect
of alteration: F(2,34) = 3.99, MSE = 6047, p < 0.03: odd shaped
fruits diﬀered only from the baseline (post hoc Tukey’s HSD:
p < 0.02) and not from the odd colored ones. The baseline
condition did not diﬀer from the color alteration one (post hoc
Tukey’s HSD: p = 0.57; see Table 1).
Discussion
Results from this experiment show an eﬀect of mapping on
participants’ accuracy. When the participants had to respond
with the dominant hand for “yes, the entity can be put inside
the backpack,” they produced more errors than for the symmetric
kind of response (left hand), likely due to an interference eﬀect.
As the eﬀect is signiﬁcant only for animals, and not for fruit,
it could be due to the unfeasibility of action in case of non-
manipulable entities.
As to analyses on RTs, interestingly we found that participants
were faster with fruits than with animals. Looking at the separate
analyses, shape alteration deteriorated the performance more
with animals than with fruits (as for animals the odd-shaped
stimuli diﬀered from both the baseline and the odd-colored
condition). This result diﬀers from our prediction of a similar
eﬀect of shape and color alterations on fruit in case of a
manipulation task. This ﬁnding could be due to the fact that
the manipulative task forced participants to focus on a possible
manipulation of entities that they are less used to directly handle
(animals) compared to fruits.
Motion
In the last Experiment we tested the same stimuli, but using
a task that triggers information on agency and self-propelled
motion (see Newell et al., 2004). We expect an eﬀect of shape
alteration aﬀecting not fruits (diﬀerently from Experiments 1 and
2), but animate entities, since shape modiﬁcations should render
animals’ self-propelled motion more diﬃcult.
Method
An independent group of nineteen students from the University
of Bologna took part in the third experiment (11 females). All
were native Italian speakers, right-handed by self- report; all
had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. They all gave their
informed consent to the experimental procedure. Their ages
ranged from 19 to 38 years old (M = 24.75; SD = 6.43). The
study was approved by the local ethic committees (Department of
Psychology, University of Bologna). We used the same materials
and procedure of previous experiments, except for the task, as for
each image 10 participants were instructed to press one key with
the right hand if the shown object typically moves; they had to
press a diﬀerent key with the left hand if the object cannot move
on its own. Nine of the participants performed the same task
with the opposite hand mapping. As in Experiment 2, after this
experiment, participants rated how each depicted object diﬀered
from how they would imagine it (see Long Term Eﬀect of Task:
Explicit Judgments).
Similarly to the previous experiment, we performed an overall
analyses and then two separate analyses for animals and fruits.
Results
Overall
We found no eﬀect of the percentage of errors. We found
a main eﬀect of the kind of alteration on response times:
F(2,34) = 6.66, MSE = 7845, η2p = 0.28, observed power = 0.89,
p < 0.005: post hoc Tukey’s HSD showed that shape-alterations
(M = 580 ms) diﬀered from the baseline condition (M = 554 ms)
and deteriorated the performance more than color-alterations
(M = 557 ms, ps < 0.02).
Animals
Percentage of errors.M = 2.07%; SD= 2.61. No signiﬁcant eﬀect
was found.
RTs. Analyses showed a main eﬀect of alteration,
F(2,34) = 7.44, MSE = 6548, p < 0.003: participants responded
slower to odd shaped stimuli (M = 589 ms) than to baseline
(M = 557 ms) and to odd colored stimuli (M = 557 ms), post hoc
Tukey’s HSD: ps < 0.007. The baseline condition did not diﬀer
from the altered-color condition (post hoc Tukey’s HSD p = 0.99,
see Table 1).
Fruits
Percentage of errors.M = 2.21%; SD = 3.12. As for animals, no
signiﬁcant eﬀect was found.
RTs. Analyses on RTs showed no signiﬁcant eﬀect with fruits
(p = 0.21, see Table 1).
Discussion
Response latencies revealed a strong eﬀect of shape alterations
with animals, while color modiﬁcations had no eﬀect. This is
likely due to the fact that animals are characterized by self-
motion, and that shape disruptions might signiﬁcantly hinder
their movement (for an investigation also on the feature of
orientation on moving objects see Jardine and Seiﬀert, 2011).
Given that no biological movement (e.g., Jastorﬀ and Orba,
2009) nor apparent motion (see Scholl and Tremoulet, 2000) was
displayed, judgments on motion for animals are strongly aﬀected
by shape. With fruit no eﬀect of shape (nor of color) was present.
This could be due to the fact that fruits are not characterized by
self-motion but by actions one can perform on them (Setti et al.,
2009): they could be easily categorized as stationary.
Possible Effects of Scaling Across
Entities
As the size of all the depicted entities was the same – across
both kinds of stimuli – to assess for possible eﬀects of scaling
an independent group of 10 participants (eight females, ages
ranging from 28 to 42 years old, M = 32.00, SD = 5.76) was
presented with the entities in their original shape and color and
were asked to rate their actual size, regardless of the image’s size,
using a four-point scale: “very small,” “small,” “large,” “very large.”
The stimuli were presented on a computer screen; the answers
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were provided by marking the corresponding box. Two random
orders of the stimuli were used. As a reference frame we showed
participants four new entities, which were neither animals nor
fruits: a marble (very small), a mug (small), a backpack (large)
and a chest (very large). As to animals, horse, shark, lion, giraﬀe,
crocodile, elephant, were consistently categorized as ‘very large’;
dog, rabbit, cat, pig, sheep, parrot, cock as ‘large’; red snapper,
mouse as ‘small’; turtle was judged as small by 7 out of 10
participants. As to fruits, pineapple, orange, avocado, banana,
carrot, kiwi, apple, apricot, grapes were categorized as ‘small’;
cherry, strawberry, almond, blackberry, walnut, hot pepper as
‘very small.’ This assessment allowed us to introduce the overall
four-levels factor of Scaling: very large scale (for “very small”
entities), large scale (for “small” entities), small scale (for “large”
entities), and very small scale (for “very large” entities). As none
of animals was categorized as “very small,” for animals the levels
of Scaling were: Large, Small and Very Small. Symmetrically, as
none of fruits-vegetables was categorized as “large” or “very large,”
for fruits-vegetables the levels of Scaling were: Very Large and
Large.
For all the three experiments, we investigated the possible
eﬀect of diﬀerent kinds of scaling by performing two separate
analyses for animals and fruits, with items as a random factor. For
animals RTs were submitted to a 3 (Alteration: Color vs. Shape vs.
Absent, baseline)× 3 (Scaling: Large scale vs. Small scale vs. Very
Small scale) mixed factor ANOVA; for fruits RTs were submitted
to a 3 (Alteration: Color vs. Shape vs. Absent, baseline) × 2
(Scaling: Very Large scale vs. Large scale) mixed factor ANOVA.
Crucially, the eﬀect of scaling was consistent and not signiﬁcant
across the three experiments (ps < 0.70). For conciseness we
will show analyses only for the Categorization task: with animals,
ANOVA on items only showed a main eﬀect of the alteration
[F(2,12) = 4.17, MSE = 5361.92, p < 0.05], but not an eﬀect of
the Scaling, p = 0.36. Similarly, ANOVA on fruits showed a main
eﬀect of alteration [F(2,13) = 3.52, MSE = 12.37.22, p < 0.05]
and no eﬀect of the Scaling, p = 0.85.
LONG TERM EFFECTS OF THE TASKS:
EXPLICIT JUDGMENTS
To evaluate whether the speciﬁc kind of task determined also a
long lasting eﬀect on the evaluation on the similarity between
the shown objects and the imagined ones, at the end of the
manipulation and motion judgments tasks, participants rated
how each depicted object diﬀered from how they would imagine
it. The obtained scores were compared to the scores collected
from an independent group of twenty participants (11 females,
ages ranging from 25 to 40 years old;M = 32.00; SD = 4.23) who
did not perform any previous task.
Method
All three groups of participants were informed that during the
rating three versions of the same entity were shown: standard,
modiﬁed in shape, modiﬁed in color. The stimuli were presented
on a computer screen; two random orders of the stimuli were
used; each item was shown once. Participants were asked to rate
how each depicted object (both the standard and the altered
ones) diﬀered from their own prototypical representation of that
entity, i.e., from how they would imagine it (“very similar” –
“not similar” at all. For an analogous assessment see also the
Verbalizer–Visualizer Questionnaire by Kirby et al., 1988). We
used a discrete interval scale, with scores ranging from 0 to 100.
To familiarize participants with the procedure, at the beginning
they were asked to perform the same rating with two entities, in
the standard and modiﬁed (color/shape) conditions; during this
phase they could ask for explanations to the experimenter. We
calculated the scores’ averages for each condition.
As the distribution of data was found to be not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from the normal one (Shapiro–Wilk test), the scores
were submitted to a 3 (Alteration: Color vs. Shape vs.
Absent – baseline) × 3 (previous Task: absent vs. manipulability
vs. agency) mixed factor ANOVA, with previous Task as
between-participants variable. We conducted the analyses with
participants as a random factor. If objects are represented as
patterns of potential actions, then participants should perceive
the shown entities as more similar to their prototypical
representations after a task focusing on manipulation (Borghi
and Riggio, 2009); the eﬀect should be particularly strong for
manipulable entities, i.e., fruits.
Results
Animals
We found a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of alteration, F(2,45)= 439.51,
MSE = 150.39, p< 0.0001: participants rated “imagined” animals
asmore similar to baseline objects (M = 5.11) than to odd colored
ones (M = 41.90, post hoc Tukey’s HSD, p < 0.0001), which in
turn diﬀered from odd shaped stimuli (M = 79.32, ps < 0.0001).
Analyses also showed a main eﬀect of the task, F(2,45) = 140.91,
MSE = 12.46, p< 0.0001, as the shown objects were judged more
similar to the imagined-prototypical ones after the manipulation
evaluation task (M = 35.20) than after the motion evaluation
task (M = 44.72, post hoc Tukey’s HSD, p < 0.05), which in turn
diﬀered from the baseline condition (M = 46.43, ps< 0.05).
Interestingly, we found an interaction between the alteration
and the task, F(2,90) = 30.13, MSE = 12.46, p < 0.0001: the
participants’ scores for odd colored animals were signiﬁcantly
TABLE 2 | The table summarizes the mean scores from the three Ratings
(i.e., without previous task; after the manipulation task; after the motion
evaluation task).
Any previous After manipulation After motion
task task evaluation task
Alteration A F A F A F
Color 50.74 59.79 29.82 34.08 45.16 47.96
(14.08) (12.21) (11.13) (9.01) (8.14) (6.86)
Shape 81.98 80.65 72.40 67.82 83.61 74.28
(7.12) (11.21) (4.57) (7.55) (5.96) (7.20)
Absent
(baseline)
6.57 5.38 3.40 5.09 5.38 5.71
(4.27) (2.81) (3.04) (2.28) (1.58) (2.29)
Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.
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lower after the motion evaluation task (M = 45.16) compared
to the baseline condition (M = 50.74, post hoc Tukey’s HSD,
p < 0.001); after the manipulation evaluation task they judged
the entities as very close to the imagined-prototypical ones
(M = 29.82, post hoc Tukey’s HSD, ps < 0.001; see Table 2).
The explicit judgments for odd shaped animals did not diﬀer for
‘absence of a previous task’ (M = 81.98) and ‘previous experiment
on motion’ (M = 83.61), while after the manipulability task the
participants’ scores were lower (M = 72.40, i.e., “very similar”)
compared to the other two conditions (ps< 0.001). Finally, scores
for the baseline condition did not diﬀer across conditions: task
absent: M = 6.57; manipulability: M = 3.40; agency M = 5.38,
post hoc Tukey’s HSD ps > 0.99; see Table 2 and Figure 2A).
Fruits
A signiﬁcant main eﬀect of alteration was present with fruit
as well, F(2,45) = 378.18, MSE = 152.80, p < 0.0001: as for
animals, participants rated “imagined” fruits as more similar to
baseline objects (M = 5.40) than to odd colored ones (M = 47.28,
post hoc Tukey’s HSD, p < 0.0001), which in turn diﬀered from
odd shaped stimuli (M = 74.25, ps < 0.0001). Analyses also
showed a main eﬀect of the task, F(2,45) = 168.06,MSE = 11.98,
p < 0.0001: as found with animals, the shown fruits were
judged more similar to the imagined-prototypical one after the
manipulation evaluation task (M = 35.67) than after the motion
evaluation task (M = 42.65, post hoc Tukey’s HSD, p < 0.0001),
which in turn diﬀered from the baseline condition (M = 48.60,
ps < 0.001).
We found an interaction between the alteration and the task,
F(2,90) = 54.06, MSE = 11.98, p < 0.0001: the participants’
scores for odd colored stimuli were signiﬁcantly lower after the
motion evaluation task (M = 47.96) compared to the baseline
condition (M = 59.79, post hoc Tukey’s HSD, p < 0.0001); after
the manipulation evaluation task they judged the shown entities
as very similar to the imagined-prototypical ones (M = 34.08,
post hoc Tukey’s HSD, ps < 0.001; see Table 2 and Figure 2B).
Unlike for animals, the performance for odd shaped fruits without
previous task (M = 80.65) and after the motion evaluation
task (M = 74.28) signiﬁcantly diﬀered (post hoc Tukey’s HSD
p < 0.001), as the motion evaluation task seemed to render
the shown fruits more similar to the imagined ones; as for
odd colored fruits, after the manipulation evaluation task the
participants obtained the lowest scores (M = 67.83, i.e., “very
similar”, ps < 0.001). As for animals, scores for the baseline
condition did not diﬀer in the case of ‘no previous task ratings’
(M = 5.38), ‘previous manipulation evaluation task’ (M = 5.09)
and ‘previous motion evaluation task’ (M = 5.71, post hoc Tukey’s
HSD ps> 1; see Table 2 and Figure 2B).
Discussion
Analyses on explicit judgments on similarity showed that the
match between the shown and the imagined-prototypical entities
was renderedmore diﬃcult by the alteration of shape, rather than
by the alteration of color, for both animals and fruit. In addition,
participants who had previously performed a manipulation
evaluation task (Experiment 2) judged shown animals and fruits
as more similar to the imagined-prototypical entities compared
both to participants who hadn’t previously performed any task
and to participants who had previously performed a motion
evaluation task (Experiment 3).
The ﬁrst result on explicit judgments conﬁrms the prominence
of shape over color. The second result, consistent for both
animals and fruit, indicates that objects are interpreted in terms
of the potential actions we can perform on them (manipulation)
rather than in terms of their own “independent” movement
(agency, self-propelled motion; see Setti et al., 2009, for a similar
conclusion). Consistent with this interpretation, analyses on
scores showed that, after the manipulation judgment, entities
altered both in shape and color were judged as more similar to
the imagined-prototypical ones if compared to the same pictures
without a previous task. Interestingly, also the motion evaluation
task rendered the entities more similar to the imagined ones,
particularly with odd colored and odd shaped fruits.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The present study aimed to investigate the role that shape and
color play in the representation of natural objects. We start from
an EG perspective (Barsalou, 2008; Borghi and Pecher, 2012;
Scorolli, 2014), that is from the idea that cognition is grounded
directly on the functioning of the nervous and bodily systems.
In this framework, biofunctional comprehension would provide
the basis for psychological understanding. The view we endorse
does not assume knowledge as an object or the body as static;
rather, underlining the fact that cognition is based on action
and oriented to action, it highlights the fact that knowledge is
a dynamic and highly context dependent process (Iran-Nejad,
2000, 2011). In such a framework, consider the respective role
of color and shape for biofunctional understanding, which might
be used as a prerequisite for psychological comprehension.
Content without color is an abstract content (see Iran-Nejad and
Ortony, 1984; Iran-Nejad and Bordbar, 2013): color is crucial
for biofunctional understanding. Shape is more than crucial, it is
intrinsically linked with biofunctional understanding. In our view
objects and entities recognition requires the ﬂexible integration
of color and shape, with shape playing a more dynamic potent
role than color, due to its privileged relationship with action. In
sum: according to the perspective we adopt our body shapes the
way we interact with objects and entities around us and the way
we represent them. Moreover action potentialities might diﬀer
depending on the considered objects/entities we have to interact
with and on the basis of the diﬀerent situation/task we have to
cope with.
We presented objects altered in color and shape and asked
participants to categorize them on diﬀerent dimensions.
Moreover, to avoid isolating domain-speciﬁc knowledge
structures from the context in which they arise and to highlight
the dynamic character of knowledge structures (Iran-Nejad,
2011), we selected diﬀerent kinds of tasks: to the more used
semantic categorization task we added the manipulation
evaluation task (i.e., a task that puts more emphasis on action)
and the motion evaluation task (i.e., a task that directs attention
to a diﬀerent property of the considered entities: the way they
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FIGURE 2 | (A,B) Participants were asked to rate how each depicted object differed from how they would imagine them. Both with animals (A) and with fruits (B) we
found an interaction between the experiment and the alteration. Error bars represent the standard error.
move). We focused on natural objects, which are typically
considered as color diagnostic, and distinguished between
manipulable and not manipulable ones, i.e., between fruit and
animals. As anticipated in the introduction, the importance
of shape and color is compatible with both embodied and
non-embodied views of cognition. However, our ﬁndings allow
to disambiguate for which tasks shape is more/less relevant than
color, as well as why they can play diﬀerent roles.
While explicit judgments on our stimuli showed greater
perceptual complexity of shape- modiﬁed entities compared to
color-modiﬁed ones (regardless of the speciﬁc kind of entity),
in Experiment 1 we found that shape alterations aﬀected more
strongly fruit than animals categorization. In the manipulation
evaluation task (Experiment 2) we found also an eﬀect of the kind
of entity, as participants were overall faster with fruits than with
animals: the manipulation evaluation task seems to implicitly
require a simulation of hand interaction (Jeannerod, 1995;
Johnson and Grafton, 2003). Nevertheless, forcing participants
to focus on a possible manipulation, with entities that they are
less used to directly handle (animals) we found that shape played
a more important role than in the categorization task. Finally
analyses on errors suggest that the accuracy in accomplishing
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the manipulation task is aﬀected by the feasibility/unfeasibility
of action: (right-handed) participants with animals performed
worse for “yes in the backpack-right hand” responses than for
“yes in backpack- left hand responses.” In the motion evaluation
task (Experiment 3), the performance was aﬀected only by the
properties’ alterations: shape still had a more important impact
than color with animals, while both color and shape alterations
did not aﬀect fruits.
Let us try to understand the experimental ﬁndings:
When we consider animate entities (animals, Predictions 1
and 3) response latencies analyses conﬁrm our predictions that
shape does have a more relevant impact than color for tasks
focusing on self-propelled motion – a capability of animate
entities that strongly depends on the structural arrangement of
body’s parts, that is on their speciﬁc shape. Moreover the present
ﬁndings extend our predictions showing that shape does have a
more crucial role than color for animals also with tasks involving
a possible action on the entities – which we are less used to
directly handling compared to fruits. These results, highlighting
the role of the speciﬁc task at hand, are in keeping with a
EG views, which ascribe an important role to the relationship
between body – movement – speciﬁc context and goal: for
animals the alteration of some bodily parts can indeed result in
impaired motion.
Consistently in the motion evaluation task shape alterations
do not inﬂuence inanimate – non-self-moving entities (fruits,
Predictions 1 and 2). Instead, with these manipulable entities
shape seems to have a higher impact than color for the semantic
categorization task. This conﬁrms our proposal that shape is
important not only for structural reasons but for its relationship
with action as well. Finally with the manipulative task we
still ﬁnd an eﬀect of shape (disadvantages for shape alteration
condition compared to the baseline condition), consistent with
the similarity between the categorization and the manipulation
evaluation task in case of manipulable entities (objects are
represented in terms of potential action patterns, Wilson, 2002;
Barsalou, 2008; Borghi and Caruana, 2015; see also van Elk et al.,
2010) but comparable to the one of color (no diﬀerences with the
odd-colored condition).
The fact that the manipulation evaluation task succeeded in
evoking the simulation of grasping objects is conﬁrmed by the
eﬀect of mapping in the analysis on accuracy: responses with
animals were less accurate with the right hand than with the left
hand for “yes backpack” responses. This seems to suggest that
manipulable and not manipulable entities diﬀerently activate the
two hands.
Finally, consistently with our predictions (Predictions 1 and
4), the investigation on the long-lasting eﬀects of the tasks (see
also Scorolli et al., 2015) showed that the previous experience
with a manipulation evaluation task rendered the shown entities
(both animals and fruit) more similar to the imagined ones. This
result is consistent with the idea that objects are represented in
terms of patterns of potential action (Borghi and Riggio, 2009).
The novel used paradigm allowed us to point out that actually
the odd-colored stimuli never deteriorated the performance if
compared to the baseline condition, but – across tasks and
entities – they diﬀerently aﬀected the response latencies when
compared to odd-shaped stimuli. Thus the present paradigm – by
contrasting shape- and color- alterations – provides information
on shape/color relative weight: the present ﬁndings show that
shape is more crucial than color for fruit in categorization tasks
and for animals in manipulation and motion tasks. Overall,
clearly in keeping with EG views, our results suggest that the role
of shape for animals is strictly linked to their possibility to move,
and not acted upon, while the importance of shape and color for
manipulable objects is strictly linked to both their possibility to
be acted upon, as well as to the speciﬁc kind of action/goal of the
action.
Compared to theories of object recognition that ascribe a
central relevance to shape (e.g., Biederman and Bar, 1999) the
novelty of this study rests on the following ﬁndings:
(a) Shape and action. The present research complements and
extends previous ﬁndings (reviewed in the Introduction),
providing evidence on response latencies, accuracy and
explicit judgments. Our ﬁndings suggest that shape is
important not only for structural reasons, but also for its
relationship with action. But this is not the only message we
can take home from our study.
(b) Shape and ﬂexibility. Consistently with previous EG
literature, our results show that, even if crucial, the role
played by shape is modulated by the task and by the kind of
stimulus. Shape is not a static property: both the nature of the
processed stimuli and the actual task strongly modulate the
relative weight of shape. Information on shape for animals
is critical both for an unfeasible manipulation task and for
a motion task; conversely with fruit information on shape
is activated when prompted by a categorization task. This
ﬂexibility is compatible with an EG account and we believe
it has implications for literature on aﬀordances.
(c) Color and ﬂexibility. Even if less than shape, also color
matters. Looking at the recent literature, evidence shows
that color is more sensitive to the contextual information
provided by the task and by the objects/entities. With a
Stroop task Connell and Lynnot (2009) showed not only
that color is important, but that it is modulated by the
linguistic context. They asked participants to read sentences
and then to perform a Stroop task. They found that color
naming performance was better when the ink color was
typical of a given object (e.g., bear in brown ink, rather
than in yellow or white ink) and when it corresponded to
the color the previously read sentence implied (e.g., bear
in white ink following “Joe was excited to see a bear at
the North Pole”). In a similar vein, Yee et al. (2012) asked
participants to perform a color-Stroop task followed by a
semantic judgment task (animal or not?). Each target was
preceded by primes related in color or not (e.g., emerald
vs. pendant > cucumber). They found color priming eﬀects
when subjects had previously performed the color-Stroop
task: the priming eﬀect was predicted by the size of the
Stroop eﬀect. As they argue, the prominence of a conceptual
characteristics can be contextually dependent, ﬂexible and
variable (for discussion see Spivey, 2007, and Kiefer and
Martens, 2010).
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As previously shown, studies on color recognition have
typically employed naming, semantic categorization and
property veriﬁcation tasks. Compared to this recent literature
on object recognition, the novelty of our study consists
in investigating the role of color: (1) compared to shape,
(2) directly altering the information provided by the visual
stimuli, (3) with diﬀerent color-diagnostic entities, (4) in
diﬀerent kinds of tasks, as to the standard categorization
task we added further tasks, that put more emphasis on
action or on motion. This novel paradigm has highlighted
that with a categorization task odd-colored fruits diﬀer
(faster responses) from odd-shaped fruits, but odd-colored
animals do not diﬀer from odd-shaped animals; conversely
with a manipulation task odd-colored fruits do not diﬀer
from odd-shaped fruits, but odd-colored animals diﬀer
(faster responses) from odd-shaped animals; ﬁnally with a
motion task odd-colored animals diﬀer (faster responses)
from odd- shaped animals (while for fruits, with a task
addressing the motion, both the property of color and shape
do not matter at all). By showing that the property of
color does have a relative diﬀerent weight if compared to
shape, our results conﬁrm the ﬂexibility of color contextual
information.
Overall, our data speak in favor of a view that underlines
the action-based but also the dynamic and ﬂexible character of
human knowledge organization – consistently with an EG view
of cognition. These ﬁndings suggest that our understanding of
the world is grounded in action, and that our body shapes the
way we interact with objects and entities around us and the way
we represent them; nevertheless the way knowledge on object
categories is accessed is not stable/automatic but ﬂexible and
contextually modulated.
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